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I.

ARGUMENT.
A.

The Nature of the Hudson Encroachments at Issue.

The Hudson fill at issue extends approximately nineteen (19) feet waterward of elevation
2437.64. R., p.217. If the Ordinary High Water Mark (OHWM) of Priest Lake, at Statehood, was
approximately two vertical feet lower than 2437.64 feet, then most, if not all, of the Hudson fill
would be located upland of the OHWM on Hudson's property. R., p. 202. In proceedings on
summary judgment, IDL stated, under oath, that "the State considers the natural Ordinary High
Water Mark of Priest Lake to be 2437.64 feet." R., p. 84.

B.

The Appeal Arises From a Decision Entered in the Context of a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment Under IRCP 56.

Respondents (collectively referred to herein as "IDL") moved the District Court for entry of
partial summary judgment on IDL's first claim for relief. R., pp. 68-71. IDL argued that it was
entitled to entry of a mandatory injunction ordering Hudson to remove all unpermitted fill he had
placed below elevation 2437.64 feet. Id. IDL based its claim on LC. §58-1302(b). Id.

C.

The Statutory Basis for IDL's Claim (I.C. §58-1302(b)).

IDL sought partial summary judgment solely on its first claim for relief. R., pp. 68-71.
IDL's first claim sought declaratory relief determining that Hudson had placed an unpermitted
encroachment, not in aid of navigation, on the bed of a navigable lake (Priest Lake). R., p. 11.
LC. §58-1302(b) defines the phrase "beds of navigable lakes" as follows:
(B) "Beds of navigable lakes" means the lands lying under or below the
1

"natural or ordinary high water mark" of a navigable lake and, for purposes of this
Act [the Lake Protection Act, LC. §58-1301, et seq.] only, the lands lying between
the natural or ordinary high water mark and the artificial high water mark, if there be
one.
See LC. §58-1302(b).
IDL had two available alternative avenues by which it could potentially have obtained partial
summary judgment on its first claim for relief. First, IDL could have demonstrated that there were
no issues of material fact in support of a finding that Hudson had placed an unpermitted
encroachment below the "natural or ordinary high water mark" of Priest Lake. Alternatively, IDL
could have attempted to demonstrate the absence of any material issue of fact supporting a finding
that Hudson had placed unpermitted fill waterward of "the artificial high water mark," ifthere be
one. However, in the context of proceedings on summary judgment, and based upon its own factual
denials, IDL could not obtain partial summary judgment based upon a finding that Hudson had
placed encroachments waterward of an "artificial high water mark."

D.

IDL Was Not Entitled to Partial Summary Judgment Based Upon the Concept
of an "Artificial High Water Mark."

It is important to again emphasize that this appeal arises from proceedings on partial

summary judgment. A party seeking relief by way of partial summary judgment "carries the burden
of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219,222,
220 P.3d 575 (2009). In this context, the Court is to liberally construe all facts in the existing record
in favor of the non-moving party, and to draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of

2

the non-moving party. See,~' Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 808 P.2d 876 (1991).
IDL judicially admitted, in the context of proceedings on summary judgment, that Priest Lake
did not have an AHWM. Specifically, in its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, IDL, through
counsel, represented to the District Court that IDL "denies that there is an artificial high water mark
of Priest Lake .... " R., p. 70. This representation was again made in the Memorandum IDL filed in
support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment: "As set forth in the State's pleadings, the State
specifically denies that there is an artificial high water mark of Priest Lake." Id. at p. 73.
IDL's denial, through counsel, that there is no AHWM on Priest Lake, constitutes a binding
judicial admission for the purposes of partial summary judgment proceedings.
This admission constitutes a bindingjudicial admission - "a formal ... statement made
by ... [an] attorney, in the course of judicial proceedings, for the purpose, or with the
effect, of dispensing with the need for proof by the opposing party of some fact."
Strouse v. K-Tek, Inc., 129 Idaho 616,618, 930 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Ct. App. 1997)
(citing McLean v. City of Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779,783,430 P.2d 670,674 (1967)).
Judicial admissions may be considered for the purposes which they were made
without admission into evidence, and a party making an admission may not
controvert the statement on appeal. Id. at 619, 930 P.2d at 1364 ....
Griff, Inc. v. Curry Bean Co., Inc., 138 Idaho 315,321, 63 P.3d 441 (2003).
Not only did IDL judicially admit that there was no AHWM on Priest Lake, it represented
the same as a matter of fact in proceedings on partial summary judgment. By way of affidavit,
offered in support of its motion, IDL presented the testimony of its Area Manager for the Priest Lake
Supervisory Area, who stated, under oath, that "The State considers the natural or ordinary high
water mark" of Priest Lake to be elevation 2437.64 feet. R., p. 84. On appeal, IDL has steadfastly
3

held the course. In its Respondent's Brief, filed with this Court on February 27, 2017, IDL
effectively doubles down: "The State does not concede that 2437.64 msl is the artificial rather than
the ordinary high water mark." See Respondents' Brief at p. 15.
Based upon its judicial and factual admissions (or denials), IDL cannot claim, by way of
partial summary judgment, that Hudson has placed an unpermitted encroachment waterward of an
AHWM. Moreover, based upon the sworn statement of IDL's Area Manager for the Priest Lake
Supervisory Area, IDL contends that the OHWM of Priest Lake is 2437.64 feet. R., p. 84. Hence,
for purposes of obtaining partial summary judgment on its first claim for relief, IDL was required
to demonstrate the absence of a material issue of fact that Hudson placed unpermitted encroachments
waterward of the "natural ordinary high water mark" of Priest Lake as opposed to waterward of an
AHWM (since IDL cannot now claim, for purposes of summary judgment, that Priest Lake has an
AHWM).

E.

Having Affirmatively Represented That There is No AHWM on Priest Lake,
Both by Way of Judicial Admission and by Sworn Affidavit, IDL Was Only
Entitled to Partial Summary Judgment if There Were no Issues of Material Fact
as to the Location of the OHWM of Priest Lake at Statehood.

Hudson does not dispute that he obtained no permit for the fill at issue. Hudson does not
dispute that IDL has regulatory authority over "the beds of navigable lakes," defined for purposes
of the Lake Protection Act as the lands lying below the OHWM or, where applicable, the AHWM.
As the non-moving party in proceedings before the District Court, Hudson accepted the State's
admissions and sworn representations that Priest Lake had no AHWM and proceeded to raise
4

material issues of fact, in opposition to IDL's motion, that his encroachments were located below
the OHWM as alleged by IDL.
The precise location of an OHWM is a question of fact. See,~. In Re: Sanders Beach, 143
Idaho 443, 147 P.3d 75 (2006). See also, Erickson v. State, 132 Idaho 208,970 P.2d 1 (1998). As
set forth more fully in Hudson's Appellant's Brief, filed with this Court on January 27, 2017,
Hudson opposed IDL's motion with affidavit evidence, including expert testimony, which raised
material issues of fact as to location of the OHWM of Priest Lake at statehood. See Appellant's
Brief at pp. 7-10. 1 On appeal, IDL appears to concede that Hudson raised genuine issues of material
fact, before the District Court, as to the location of the OHWM of Priest Lake.
If the State had moved for summary judgment on its second cause of action, trespass
on the State's ownership interest in the lake bed under the equal footing doctrine,
such a disagreement may have created a genuine issue of material fact.
See Respondents' Brief at p. 13.

F.

The District Court Erred by Granting IDL Relief, by Way of Partial Summary
Judgment, to Which IDL Was Not Entitled.

The District Court granted IDL' s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, finding in material
part as follows:
The Court finds that pursuant to the definition of a lake bed in Idaho Code
§58-1302, it does not matter whether the fill is located below the OHWM, or

This evidence included expert opinion based upon hydrograph interpretation and
historic survey information, including the location of the original Government Land Office (GLO)
meanderline based upon the Manual of Surveying Instructions in effect at the time of the original
GLO survey of Priest Lake in September of 1990.
5

between the OHWM and the AHWM, if there is one; because the statute makes clear
that the State ofldaho has the power to regulate and control encroachments on land
lying between the OHWM and the AHWM.
R., p. 312. Given the specific procedural context of this case, and IDL'sjudicial admissions and
sworn statements, the District Court plainly erred.
Essentially, the District Court granted IDL partial summary judgment on a statutory cause
of action with no proof of a necessary element thereof. In order to grant IDL partial summary
judgment, the District Court was required to find that there were no material issues of fact as to: (1)
the fact that Priest Lake had an AHWM, the location of said AHWM, and that Hudson's
encroachments were located below the elevation of said AHWM; or (2) the location of Priest Lake's
OHWM and that Hudson's encroachments were located below the elevation of OHWM. Since IDL
judicially admitted that Priest Lake had no AHWM, and submitted sworn testimony that the AHWM
of Priest Lake was 2437.64, the only way IDL could have properly obtained summary judgment was
if the Court had determined that there were no material issues of fact as to the location of the
OHWM of Priest Lake, at statehood, at elevation 2437.64 feet.
Given the applicable standards on summary judgment, which provide that all inferences are
to be made in favor of the non-moving party, and given the controverting affidavits filed by Hudson,
the District Court could not find there were no material issues fact as to the location of Priest Lake's
OHWM at statehood. If Hudson is correct, and should he carry his burden at trial, thus showing that
the OHWM of Priest Lake at statehood was two vertical feet less than 2437.64 feet, then the
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encroachments at issue required no permit and are in fact located on his own property. Under these
circumstances, it would be Hudson who would be entitled to an entry of judgment, not IDL.

G.

Hudson's "Estoppel" Argument.

Both before the District Court, and on appeal, Hudson urged that IDL should be estopped
from claiming relief, by way of partial summary judgment, based upon the existence of an artificial
high water mark. While labeled an argument sounding in "estoppel," the argument is essentially
predicated upon the doctrine of judicial admission.
As discussed more fully above, in Griff, Inc. v. Curry Bean Co., Inc., 138 Idaho 315, this
Court held that statements made by an attorney in the course ofjudicial proceedings, for the purpose
of dispensing with the need for proof by the opposing party of some fact, were binding upon the
party whose counsel made the admission. In this context, IDL's counsel affirmatively denied, by
way ofjudicial admission, that there was an AHWM on Priest Lake. As the Court held in Griff, Inc.
v. Curry Bean Co., Inc., "[A] party making an admission may not controvert the statement on
appeal." 138 Idaho at 321.
Hudson suggests to this Court, as he did to the District Court, that IDL cannot avail itself of
a specific statutory remedy when ID L denies (through judicial admissions and sworn statements) the
existence of a fact necessary to support an element of the claim.
On appeal, IDL seeks to argue that the District Court's Partial Summary Judgment was
correct because Hudson suggested that Priest Lake may have an AHWM. See, Respondents' Brief
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at pp. 18-19. Regrettably, IDL does still not fully appreciate procedural context from which this
appeal emanates. IDL admitted that Priest Lake had no AHWM. Based upon that admission, and
pursuant to this Court's holding in Griff. Inc. v. Curry Bean Co., Inc., supra, Hudson had no further
burden of proof on the issue and was entitled to rely upon IDL's position that Priest Lake had no
AHWM. Even if the District Court considered Hudson's alternative pleading in reaching its
decision, the result would be the same: the location of an AHWM presents an issue of fact.
However, since IDL denied that Priest Lake had an AHWM, Hudson was entitled to rely upon that
position, both before the District Court and on appeal.

H.

IDL is Not Entitled to Costs and Attorney Fees.

On appeal, IDL raises an additional issue: Whether the State is entitled to its attorney fees
and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41 and Idaho Code §§12-11 7 and 12121. Based upon the current status of the law, IDL would only be entitled to attorney fees and costs
on appeal (1) if it prevailed and (2) if Hudson proceeded with this appeal without a reasonable basis
in fact or law. Neither element is present.
IDL is to blame for the procedural posture in which it finds itself. IDL admitted that Priest
Lake has no AHWM. Why wouldn't IDL admit that Priest Lake has an AHWM or the elevation
thereof?

One can speculate.

It appears reasonable to conclude that IDL did not want to

acknowledge, admit, or prove the existence of an AHWM because it did not wish to run the risk of
divesting the State of title of submerged lands lying between such an AHWM and the OHWM of
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Priest Lake. Regardless, having affirmatively denied the existence of an AHWM, IDL should not
be heard to complain that the partial summary judgment was improperly entered. The posture of this
case is factually and procedurally distinct. The posture of this case on appeal is a direct result of the
method and manner by which IDL chose to proceed. Hudson's position is factually and legally
supported, and it would be improper, whether or not Hudson prevails on appeal, to award IDL its
attorney fees.

II.

CONCLUSION.
Based upon the reasons and authorities set forth herein, as well as those contained in

Appellant Philip Hudson's Opening Brief on appeal, Hudson respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order on partial summary judgment, vacate
the District Court's Judgment and Amended Judgment, dissolve the District Court's mandatory and
permanent injunction, remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this Court's opinion,
and award Hudson his er;:, on appeal.
Dated this

Af

da~ of April, 2017.

or Appellant Philip Hudson
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